Negative equity tally more than quadruples since September

More than 4,800 recent first-home buyers who purchased with low deposits over the past year are now estimated to be in negative equity, according to analysis published by realestate.com.au on 18 November 2026. The figure has climbed from 1,143 in September and just 87 in July, a pace of deterioration the report describes as accelerating since February. Of first-home buyers who borrowed using the federal government's 5% deposit scheme over the past 12 months, 7.9% are now estimated to be in negative equity — meaning the outstanding loan exceeds the current value of the property.

The estimate assumes a 5% deposit was used and no offset account reduced the effective loan balance, which the report flags as likely an upper bound, though one that is still growing. Stripping out the most recent September quarter, where price movements have been smaller, the proportion of negative-equity 5% deposit borrowers in the trailing period rises to 10.2%, underlining how concentrated the pressure has become among the most recent, thinnest-margin purchases.

Rates, repayments and a scheme that pulled demand forward

The deterioration is unfolding against a backdrop of rising borrowing costs. The Reserve Bank of Australia lifted the cash rate to 4.85% two weeks before the report's publication, pushing mortgage repayments as a share of gross income to an estimated 36.9% for the typical household buying a median-priced home on preliminary September sales data — just below the 37.5% record set in 1989, according to the report.

Layered on top of higher repayments is a policy-driven surge in low-deposit borrowing. The federal government expanded its 5% deposit scheme in October 2025, removing income caps and allocating unlimited places. Uptake has been substantial: the scheme accounted for at least 52% of first-home buyer loans over the past 12 months, up from 25% before expansion, the report states. That bring-forward in demand shortened saving timelines, intensified competition and bid up prices below the scheme's threshold caps — with investors also active in the same price bands before federal budget tax changes added further demand. Over the past four months, prices at the more affordable end of the market have fallen in some cases faster than scheme borrowers could build equity, the report notes.

Western Australia carries a disproportionate share of the exposure

The negative equity cohort is heavily skewed toward one state. More than a fifth — 22% — of first-home buyers in Western Australia who used the scheme are currently estimated to be in negative equity, the report found. Perth median home values are down 5.7% from their March peak. Western Australia represents around 11% of households that received a government guarantee nationally, but accounts for 32% of households now in negative equity — a disproportionate concentration the report links partly to the state's exposure to the resources cycle, with iron ore prices down about 15% year to date.

Victoria sits at the other end of the spectrum. It has the largest share of first-home buyers using the scheme — 34% of guarantees issued since expansion — yet remains underrepresented in current negative equity estimates. The report attributes this to a slower, more concentrated downturn in higher-income Victorian areas, where the $950,000 threshold cap limits the price band accessible to scheme users.

WPF analysis: what this split implies for low-deposit buyers

World Property Forum analysis of the reported figures suggests the state-level gap is less about deposit size and more about regional price volatility interacting with thin equity buffers. A 5% deposit leaves almost no cushion against a price fall; in a market like Perth, where values are already down from a March peak and tied to a commodity cycle, even modest further softening can tip a recent purchase into negative equity faster than in a market experiencing a slower, higher-income-led correction such as Victoria's.

This is a reported outcome of the policy design interacting with regional economic structure, not evidence of system-wide distress. The report itself frames negative equity as largely “a paper problem until households reach financial stress,” and notes the Reserve Bank's financial stability review records these risks as low overall. WPF analysis would add that the relevant test for any individual low-deposit borrower is not the valuation gap itself but continued employment and income stability, since negative equity only becomes a realised loss on a forced sale.

Practical due-diligence questions for scheme borrowers and prospective buyers

The report's figures raise several questions that recent and prospective low-deposit buyers may want to put to a mortgage broker or financial adviser rather than assume answers to:

  • How does a 5% deposit loan balance compare with a current, independent valuation of the property, allowing for recent price movements in that specific suburb or region?
  • What offset account or extra-repayment options are available to rebuild equity faster than the minimum repayment schedule?
  • How exposed is household income to the same regional economic cycle driving local price falls — for example, employment tied to resources-sector conditions in Western Australia?
  • What would a forced sale scenario look like under the current loan-to-value position, and does loan structuring (fixed vs variable, interest-only periods) change that exposure?

The report does not provide answers specific to individual circumstances, and none should be assumed from the aggregate figures alone.

Limitations of the estimate

The report is explicit that its 4,808 figure is a modelled estimate rather than a count of confirmed negative-equity loans. It assumes a 5% deposit was used with no offset account reducing the effective balance, which the report itself says likely overstates the true figure, even as the trend has been consistently upward since July. The analysis also covers only scheme-assisted low-deposit buyers from the past 12 months; it does not purport to describe conditions across the broader first-home buyer population or the housing market generally, where the report notes equity buffers, offset accounts and historically low unemployment have left most households in a comparatively strong position.

Alternatives and next steps for stretched Australian buyers

The report contains no data on international alternatives to Australian property markets. Readers wanting broader context can review the Australia vs New Zealand property investment comparison, or the Buying Property in Portugal guide, which outlines entry costs and legal framework for international buyers unrelated to the domestic negative equity dynamics described here.

The report describes its negative-equity estimate as a growing, point-in-time figure that has risen consistently since July, with Western Australia showing the sharpest concentration of risk among the states covered.

Further reading and context